“To start with, these studies suggest that there may be something slightly misleading in talking about a person’s God concept. Rather, in each individual we may have multiple concepts of God or a very flexible concept of God that adapts to particular contexts. We may use one concept when reflecting on what God’s properties are and doing theological, analytical work and use a different concept or concepts when we are more reflexively and less self-consciously thinking about God. Similarly, it may be that the God that we reason about is different than the God we relate to. This distinction between faster, more intuitive, less conscious religious thought and slower, more counterintuitive, conscious theological thought has been part of the legacy of these studies (e.g., Barrett 2011; McCauley 2011; Slone 2004). Furthermore, the notion that different, seemingly incompatible cultural and religious concepts may be triggered in some situations but not others has been supported by other studies in cognitive science of religion (e.g., Astuti & Harris 2008; Bek & Lock 2011; Cohen & Barrett 2008).”
— The Cognitive Science of Religion: A Methodological Introduction to Key Empirical Studies (Scientific Studies of Religion: Inquiry and Explanation) door D. Jason Slone, William W. McCorkle Jr.